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It is a general rule, in civil law jurisdictions, that contracts must 
be performed in good faith. However, the fundamental nature of the 
good faith principle remains a matter for scholarly debate. The case 
of Lamar Contractors, Inc. v. Kacco, Inc.1 illustrates how the prin-
ciple that all contracts must be performed in good faith2 interacts 
with contract dissolution and allocation of damages.  
I. BACKGROUND 
In this case, Lamar Contractors, Inc. was a general contractor on 
a construction project. Lamar hired a subcontractor named Kacco, 
Inc. The subcontractor was to provide metal framing and drywall 
                                                                                                             
 ∗   J.D. candidate (May 2018), Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State 
University.  
 †  Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair, 
Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana State University. The au-
thors thank Christabelle Lefebvre for her careful editing. 
 1. Lamar Contractors, Inc. v. Kacco, Inc. 2015-1430 (La. 05/03/16), 189 So. 
3d 394 (2016). 
 2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2017). 
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work for the construction project. The subcontractor contract in-
cluded a “pay-if-paid” payment provision; it allowed Lamar ten 
days to give payment to the subcontractors after receipt of the pay-
ment from the owner. 
Kacco began work on the project in October 2010, but had reg-
ular problems providing manpower and paying for supplies. On No-
vember 9, 2010, a Lamar representative sent a certified letter to 
Kacco expressing concerns regarding the timely completion of the 
project. Kacco responded by email and explained that the account 
had been put on hold. Additionally, Kacco was unable to pay a por-
tion of the balance due to insufficient funds. It requested that Lamar 
issue a joint check to Kacco and the supplier. Lamar agreed, on the 
condition that Kacco pay a ten percent back charge for the cost of 
purchased materials. Kacco refused and during the waiting period 
was able to pay the debt down; it then continued to work through 
the months of November and December of that same year. An in-
voice was submitted for the forty-five percent of work completed, 
and Lamar made payment prior to receiving funds from the owner. 
On January 13, 2011, Lamar sent notice addressing the same 
concerns regarding Kacco’s inability to perform the work required 
under the contract. Kacco asked Lamar to be allowed to finish the 
job. Kacco completed the metal framing and stud work; however, 
upon inspection of the work, Lamar found deficiencies. 
Later, on January 31, 2011, Kacco notified Lamar that it was 
awaiting payment for the December invoice to pay the supplier and 
order the required materials to complete the work. Lamar had re-
ceived payment from the owner on January 26, 2011, but was not 
required, under the contract with Kacco, to remit payment until ten 
business days later, on February 5, 2011. 
Lamar sent notice on February 3, 2011, to Kacco stating that the 
subcontract would be terminated if Kacco did not provide sufficient 
manpower and materials within forty-eight hours. Kacco did not re-
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spond or return to the job site. Two days later, by a letter dated Feb-
ruary 5, 2011, Lamar declared the contract terminated, and subse-
quently hired another subcontractor to complete the work. 
Lamar sued Kacco for failure to perform the contract. Kacco 
filed a reconventional demand against Lamar for failure to pay 
Kacco for the work performed under the contract, alleging that their 
failure to pay caused them to fail to perform the contract. The district 
court ruled that Kacco failed to perform the contract and was liable 
to Lamar, awarding damages in the amount of $24,116.67 plus in-
terest and attorney’s fees. Additionally, the district court entered a 
judgment in the amount of $60,020 plus interest in favor of Kacco 
on the reconventional demand. The judgment notes that Kacco 
failed to provide sufficient materials to complete the work. How-
ever, Lamar negligently withheld payments for completed work by 
Kacco, which contributed to Kacco’s inability to perform. The rul-
ing was based on Louisiana Civil Code article 2003.3 Lamar ap-
pealed the judgment, which was affirmed in its entirety. Upon La-
mar’s application, certiorari was granted, thereby allowing the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court to pronounce for the first time on article 2003 
after the 1984 revision of the law of obligations. 
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court limited its ruling to answering the sole issue 
presented in the appeal: “whether the district court erred in reducing 
Lamar’s damages for breach of contract [sic] based on a finding that 
Lamar’s negligence contributed to Kacco’s breach of the contract 
                                                                                                             
 3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2003 (2017):  
An obligee may not recover damages when his own bad faith has caused 
the obligor's failure to perform or when, at the time of the contract, he 
has concealed from the obligor facts that he knew or should have known 
would cause a failure. 
If the obligee's negligence contributes to the obligor's failure to perform, 
the damages are reduced in proportion to that negligence. 
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[sic].”4 As the judgment states, “our sole focus is on whether La-
mar’s actions during the relevant time frame contributed to that 
breach for purposes of La. Civ. Code article 2003.”5 Indeed, looking 
into jurisprudence based on pre-revision article 1934, the predeces-
sor to article 2003, the Court concludes that “an obligor cannot es-
tablish an obligee has contributed to the obligor’s failure to perform 
unless the obligor can prove the obligee itself failed to perform du-
ties owed under the contract.”6 
The Court rightly restates the requirement in article 2003 para-
graph 2 when saying that “Kacco must demonstrate that Lamar 
failed to perform its obligation under the contract, which in turn con-
tributed to Kacco’s breach of the contract.”7 The Courts, then, re-
views what it describes as the “undisputed facts”8:  
[O]n January 31, 2011, Kacco notified Lamar that Kacco 
was waiting on the payment of its December invoice to pay 
the supplier and order the necessary supplies to complete the 
punch list. Lamar had received payment from the owner on 
January 26, 2011. However, pursuant to the terms of the con-
tract, Lamar was not required to make payment to Kacco un-
til February 9, 2011, ten business days later.9 
With respect, the Court should have noted February 5 if compu-
ting correctly, a detail that has its importance. The following para-
graph also needs to be quoted for its full terms: 
On February 3, 2011, during this ten-day period, Lamar ad-
vised Kacco that Kacco’s contract would be terminated if 
Kacco did not provide sufficient manpower and materials 
within forty-eight hours. Kacco did not respond to Lamar or 
return to the job site. Lamar officially terminated Kacco’s 
subcontract in a letter dated February 5, 2011. Thus, the con-
tract was terminated on February 5, 2011, before Lamar’s 
                                                                                                             
 4. Lamar, 89 So. 3d at 397. Note the confusing usage of the common law 
terminology “breach of contract” rather than the civil law “failure to perform.” 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 398. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  
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obligation to make payment to Kacco became due on Febru-
ary 9, 2011.10  
Based on the Court’s reading of the facts, assuming that the con-
tract was validly terminated on February 5, given the fact that per-
formance by the obligee was due on February 9, the Court could 
rightly conclude the following: 
Under these circumstances, it is clear Lamar did not violate 
any obligation owed under the contract to make payment to 
Kacco and could not have negligently contributed to Kacco’s 
breach of its obligations under the contract. Accordingly, the 
district court erred in applying the provisions of La. Civ. 
Code art. 2003 to reduce Lamar’s award of damages.11 
Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeal was vacated and 
the case was remanded to the district court for the sole purpose of 
entering an amended judgment in favor of Lamar, for the full 
amount of damages and with no reduction for contributory negli-
gence.  
However, the problem is that based on the facts as they appear 
in the judgment, nothing (other than the unilateral declaration by La-
mar) warrants that the contract had been officially terminated on 
February 5, and this date comes close to the precise moment when 
Lamar actually owed payment to Kacco. Though the Court seems, 
on the face of its reading of the facts, to have correctly applied the 
rule in article 2003 paragraph 2, a closer look shows the following: 
- That there was valid termination of contract can be doubted, ab-
sence of termination supporting the challenged judgment; 
- If the contract had been validly terminated, the proximity of the 
date of termination with the due date of performance by the ob-
ligee casts doubts as to the obligee’s good faith, though this may 
be mitigated by the silence and inaction of the obligor.  
                                                                                                             
 10. Id. (emphasis added).  
 11. Id. 
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This case offers a most interesting setting to revisit the interac-
tion of good faith with contract performance and termination and its 
impact on court allocation of damages.  
III. COMMENTARY 
This commentary will first discuss the impact of the obligee’s 
good faith in contract performance and its impact on the allocation 
of damages, assuming that the Supreme Court was legally justified 
in concluding that the contract had been terminated. Revisiting the 
issue of contract dissolution warrants further analysis of the obli-
gee’s duty of good faith.  
A. The Duty of Good Faith in Contract Performance 
Every contract imposes a duty for the contracting parties to act 
in good faith. Like most civil codes, the Louisiana Civil Code does 
not define good faith. Article 1759 states that, “[g]ood faith shall 
govern the conduct of the obligor and the obligee in whatever per-
tains to the obligation;” and article 1983 adds that “[c]ontracts must 
be performed in good faith.” 
The Louisiana Supreme Court assumes that Lamar has been act-
ing in good faith all along the performance of its contract with 
Kacco, its subcontractor. A “pay-if-paid” provision in the contract 
afforded Lamar ten days to remit payment to its subcontractor after 
receipt of payment from the owner of the building project. However, 
the record shows that Lamar paid Kacco ahead of time when Kacco 
had accomplished forty-five percent of the work, since it had been 
made aware that Kacco’s delay was due to Kacco’s inability to pro-
vide manpower and pay for supplies. This portrays Lamar as a co-
operative obligee, acting in a way that favors contract performance 
by the obligor, yet without ever renouncing its contractual right to 
full performance. 
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The term good faith has more than one definition.12 Citing to 
French sources and to § 2.103(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
the late Saúl Litvinoff noted that “it consists of honesty in a party’s 
contractual behavior, or loyalty to, or collaboration with, the other 
party.”13 He then observed: 
The fact cannot be ignored, however, that as much difficulty 
may be encountered in defining honesty or loyalty as in de-
fining good faith, which turns those definitional attempts 
into mere substitutions of words that fail to provide the clar-
ity warrantedly expected from either a definition or an ex-
planation.14 
Yet, in the context of contract performance, the law attaches sig-
nificant consequences to the existence or absence of good faith. La-
mar’s good faith as obligee is essential in its attempt to recover con-
tract damages. Not that it needs to prove it (good faith is presumed 
throughout the civil law tradition),15 but because on a show of the 
obligee’s bad faith and by proving that this bad faith caused the ob-
ligor’s failure to perform, Kacco, the obligor, may not owe damages. 
The first paragraph of article 2003 offers an all-or-nothing solution, 
stemming from pre-revision article 1934(4). This is a much more 
radical solution than simply reducing the amount of damages in pro-
portion of the obligee’s negligence, when it contributes to the obli-
gor’s failure to perform, as stated in the post-revision article 2003 
paragraph 2.16  
It, therefore, comes as no surprise that earlier jurisprudence 
based on the old article 1934(4) stated that bad faith in this context 
                                                                                                             
 12. Saúl Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (1997). 
 13. Id. at 1663. 
 14. Id. at 1664. 
 15. Civil Code [Fr.], art. 2274 (formerly art. 2268, renumbered by Law no. 
2008-561 of June 17, 2008, art. 2): “Good faith is always presumed, and he who 
alleges bad faith must prove it.” 
 16. Comment (b) invites to compare with article 2323, dealing with compar-
ative negligence in the title dealing with extra-contractual (tort) liability. 
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had to amount to a breach of contract by the obligee, making perfor-
mance of the contract much more difficult for the obligor.17 This 
interpretation fits the logic of reciprocity existing in synallagmatic 
contracts. However, it has the effect of stretching the meaning of 
bad faith to the extreme case of nonperformance of a contractual 
obligation.18  
Though noting that nonperformance by Kacco was caused by the 
non-payment by Lamar, the district court did not apply the all-or-
nothing bad faith provision, but the post-revision option of reducing 
damages in proportion of the obligee’s negligence (article 2003 par-
agraph 2). Pointing out that the obligee’s performance was due past 
the date of dissolution of the contract was sufficient motive for re-
versal.  
This leads to a fundamental question, central to the resolution of 
our case: was the contract properly dissolved before the term of pay-
ment by the obligee? 
B. The Duty of Good Faith in Contract Dissolution 
The Supreme Court takes it for granted that the contract was of-
ficially terminated by the note sent by Lamar on February 5, at the 
expiration of the forty-eight-hour notice they had sent and was met 
by silence and inaction by Kacco.19 This at least discards a common 
law reading of the case: whereas in common law the contract typi-
cally does not survive fundamental breach by one of the parties, in 
civil law the contract is a legal relationship that survives non-perfor-
mance and can only be dissolved according to conditions set out by 
                                                                                                             
 17. The Supreme Court cites Board of Levee Commissioners of Orleans 
Levee District v. Hulse, 120 So. 589, 167 La. 896 (1929), also cited in LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 2003 (2017) comment (b), comment (a) indicating that this article does 
not change the law; Lamar, 89 So. 3d at 398.  
 18. Good faith has been defined as performance “in conformity with the in-
tention of the parties and in the light of the purpose for which [agreements] have 
been formed.” AUBRY & RAU, 4 DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 346 (6th ed., A.N. Yian-
nopoulos trans., West 1965). 
 19. Lamar, 89 So. 3d at 399. 
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the law. This is why it is so important to use the word “breach” spar-
ingly, as it creates the mental picture of a destroyed and terminated 
contract.  
According to the civil law tradition, dissolution of contract is 
typically judicial.20 There is no indication, in our case, of a petition 
by Lamar that the contract be judicially resolved. We may, there-
fore, be in a situation where the obligee has a right, “according to 
the circumstances, to regard the contract as dissolved.”21  
The parties may have expressly agreed that the contract shall be 
dissolved for the failure to perform a particular obligation, as pro-
vided for in article 2017, which states that: “[i]n that case, the con-
tract is deemed dissolved at the time it provides for or, in the absence 
of such a provision, at the time the obligee gives notice to the obligor 
that he avails himself of the dissolution clause.”22 The ruling of the 
Supreme Court is perfectly compatible with the existence of a dis-
solution clause that does not provide for a certain term and, there-
fore, leaves the obligor with a reasonable time for performance.23 
In the absence of a dissolution clause, given the fact that there 
has been no judicial dissolution, we are left with two remaining pos-
sibilities: dissolution after notice to perform (article 2015) and dis-
solution without notice to perform (article 2016).  
We understand from the facts of the case that Lamar lost pa-
tience and confidence in Kacco’s ability to offer satisfactory and 
timely performance, and did not want to make payment without hav-
ing assurances that there would be due performance. Hence, their 
issuing a two-day ultimatum that can be analyzed as an article 2015 
“notice to perform within a certain time, with a warning that, unless 
performance is rendered within that time, the contract shall be 
deemed dissolved.” This amounts to inserting unilaterally a term 
certain for performance together with an express dissolution clause, 
                                                                                                             
 20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2013 (2017): “When the obligor fails to perform, the 
obligee has a right to the judicial resolution of the contract . . . .” 
 21. Id. at art. 2013 in fine (2017).  
 22. Id. at art. 2017 (2017). 
 23. Id. at art.1778 (2017). 
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whilst allowing additional time for performance in situations where 
there is obviously a delay.24 This convenient way out allows a frus-
trated obligee to terminate the contract without judicial action, in the 
absence of an express dissolution clause.  
Article 2015, however, does not seem to make room for a harsh 
ultimatum. As provided by article 2015, “[t]he time allowed for that 
purpose must be reasonable according to the circumstances.” In the 
present case, Lamar granted a period of forty-eight hours. This may 
seem unreasonably short in a long-term contract taking weeks or 
months to perform. Had Lamar requested full performance in a pe-
riod of two days, there is no way the additional time could be re-
garded as reasonable. However, Lamar did not call for full perfor-
mance in two days. The obligee only wanted assurances that the con-
tract could be performed, requesting Kacco, the obligor, to mobilize 
the work force needed for completion.  
Given the tense situation and the threat of termination, it was 
very unwise for Kacco to remain passive and even more, totally si-
lent. This brings us to the scenario envisioned in Civil Code article 
2016, allowing for termination without notice, providing that “when 
it is evident that the obligor will not perform, the obligee may regard 
the contract as dissolved without any notice to the obligor.” 
We reach the point of the discussion where the duty of good faith 
appears as a two-way street. Knowing of Kacco’s delays and cash-
flow difficulties, Lamar had to give reasonable notice with sufficient 
time for performance. In a civil law jurisdiction, delay in perfor-
mance does not per se warrant contract dissolution. One may ques-
tion whether or not Lamar acted in a loyal or collaborative manner. 
The forty-eight-hour grace period expiring just four days before La-
mar’s contractual date of payment for the work that had been done 
looks like pushing for termination rather than giving a last chance 
                                                                                                             
 24. This parallels the grace period that may be granted by a court, in accord-
ance with LA. CIV. CODE art. 2013 para. 2 (2017): “[i]n an action involving judi-
cial dissolution, the obligor who failed to perform may be granted, according to 
the circumstances, an additional time to perform.” 
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for performance; Lamar probably guessing that Kacco needed cash 
to secure full performance.  
However, knowing that the situation was getting tense, total si-
lence and passivity on the part of Kacco can be objectively under-
stood, in a business sense, as an implied statement that they did not 
intend to complete performance. Had they prayed for an additional 
grace period of say, a few hours, just enough to secure payment, 
insisting on their willingness to perform, they may have deserved 
the generous award granted by the district court and upheld by the 
court of appeal. By its lack of response to the ultimatum and its sub-
sequent lack of reliance on Civil Code dissolution rules when the 
case was argued before the Supreme Court, Kacco did not show 
good faith or bad faith, but simply lacked faith in its ability to save 
a bargain or avert a loss.  
 
